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given to the Jews in the old dispensation do not form the basis
of any legal code in Christendom, and to select one commandment
and leave the others out is manifestly absurd. It is to be hoped
that, not alone from the chance of condemning a wrong party, but
from general motives of humanity, and a consideration of the
utter uselessness of public executions in the way of example,
capital punishment will ere long be numbered among the extinct
barbarisms, and other and-more rational means adopted for main.
taining the integrity of the law and the peace of society.
3. F. B.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
ANN KLINE v. SAMUEL KLINE ET AL.
An ante-nuptial contract between husband and wife, in respect to the disposition
and enjoyment of their respective estates, is one in which both parties should
exhibit the utmost good faith; and any designed and material concealment ought
to avoid the contract at the will 'of the injured party.

THis was a writ of error t&the Common Pleas of Montgomery
county.
. In the court below it was an issue directed to try the validity
of a certain writing, called an ante-nuptial 'contract, made between Gabriel Kline and Ann Hendricks.
The plaintiff in error is one of the parties to the agreement,
and is the widow of said Gabriel Kline, who died in the year
1867. His widow claimed her share of his estate. Her demand
was opposed by the children of decedent, and an ante-nuptial
agreement, dated March 21st 1850, presented as a bar to her
claim.
This agreement was made under the following" circumstances:
Ann Kline, then Ann Hendricks, was employed by the decedent,
after; the death of his first wife, as housekeeper. Shortly after
her assumption of this position, the decedbnt proposed to marry
her, and was accepted. *The decedent then called alone upou
a justice of the peace, living in the vicinity, and employ ed him
to write what he called a " marriage agreement." After it was
written, the justice and decedent went over'to decedent's house,
where Ann Hendricks, his intended wife;, was. The agreement
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did not show that Kline owned any property but the house he
lived in, worth about $800, but his real and personal estate was
then worth at least $12,000. The instrument was read tO her in
English (she being entirely unable to speak or understand the
language), and parts of it were then translated to her in German. She executed the paper, confiding altogether in the honesty
and integrity of her intended husband. Nothing was said to her
as to the property o'wned by him, nor as to what her rights would
be as his widow. She was not told, and did not know, that her
.separate property would be her own as fully after marriage as
before. She executed the paper by making her mark, being
unable either to read or-write. They were married at once, and
lived together as man and wife from that day until the death of
the husband.
By the agreement, the widow wiias only entitled to the- househol goods which constituted her own separate estate before her
marriage, "the use of the north end of the dwelling-house so
long as she remains my widow," "kitchen on first floor, one
room and entty on second floor, half of the garden, and water
out of'the well," "also forty dollars per year during her natural
life."
The decedent's estate amounted to about $17,000.
On the trial it was contended by plaintiff, in error that, a confidential relat'ion existed between Gabriel Kline and her, and that
it was incumbent on the defendants in error to show that Gabriel
Kline fully informed hdr of the amount and extent of the. property
owned by him before the execution of the agreement.
This the presiding judge negatived, aid charged that "the
woman was bound to exercise her judgment and take advantage
of the opportunity that existed, to obtain information; if she did
not do so, it was her own fault. The. parties were dealing at
arm's length. He was not bound to disclose to- her the amount
or value of his property."
This charge was assigned for error.

a.
B.

B. Fox and C. Hunsicker, for plaintiff in error.
l. Boyer and D. H. Mulvan/y, for defendants in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-Upon a question arising in the Orphans'
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Court as to the right of the widow of Gabriel Kline to any share
of his estate, an issue was directed to try the validity of an antenuptial contract between her and the intestate, dated March 21st
1850, by which it seems to have been assumed that she had by
anticipation renounced or released all her rights as widow.
Whether the instrument does bear that meaning is a question
which does not arise on this record, has not been argued, and
upon it, we desire to be understood, there is no opinion either
expressed or to be implied in the judgment we now enter. The
deed was executed by the parties a very short time before their
marriage, and it was alleged on behalf of the widow that the circumstances of her intended husband were concealed from her and
iiiisrepresented in the writing itself, in consequence of which she
was induced for a very inadequate consideration to subscribe it.
Evidence tending to show thii was given. It was contended .on
her part that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs in the issue to
show that Gabriel Kline fully informed her of the amount and
extent of the property owned by him. Had the judge contented
himself with giving a simple negative to this proposition, it would
perhaps have been unexceptionable. But his charge was much
broader, for he instructed the jury that "1the woman was bound
to exercise her judgment and take advantage of the opportunity
that existed to obtain information ; if she did not do so, it was
her own fault. The parties were dealing at 'arm's length. He
was not bound to disclose, to her the amount or value of )iis
property." This part of the charge was excepted to, and is
assigned for error.
There is perhaps no relation of life in which more'unbounded
confidence is reposed than in that existing between parties who
are betrothed to each other. Especially does the woman place
the most implicit trust in the truth and affection of him in whose
keeping she is about to--deposit the happiness of her future life.
From him she has no secrets; -she believes he has none from her.
To consider such persons as in the same category with buyers and
sellers, and to say that they are dealing at arm's length, we think
is a mistake. Surefy when a man and woman are on the eve Qf
marriage, and it is proposed between them, as in this iiistance,
to enter into an ante-nuptial contract upon the subject of "the
enjoyment and disposition of their respective estates," it is the
duty of each to be frank and unreserved in the disclosure of all
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circumstances materially bearing on the contemplated agreement.
It may perhaps be presumed in the first instance that such disclosure was made, but any designed and material concealment
ought to avoid the contract at the will of the party who has been
injured. Neither Judge Story, nor any other elementary writer,
has pretended to give an exhaustive catalogue of those confidential relations which require the utmost good faith (uberrima fides)
in all transactions between the, parties: 1 Story's Eq. § 215.
That distinguished jurist, in commenting upon the class of cases
in which secret and underhand agreements, in fraud of marital
rights, have been relieved against in eqluity, remarks, that while
they, are meditated frauds on innocent parties, and upon that
account properly held invalid, yet.that the doctrine has "a higher
foundation, in the security which it is designed to throw round
the contract of -marriage,by placing all parties upon the basis
of good faith, mutual confidence, and equality of condition :" 1
Story's Eq. § 267.
If, indeed, this agreement was intended to debar the wife of all
future right ti any share of her husband's estate in case she
survived him, it was a most unequal and unjust bargain. It holds
out the idea in the recital that his only property was the house
and lot he then occupied, while the jury might have inferred
from the evidence that he was worth at that time ten times its
value. It bestows on her a portion of the house for life, with
her wn household goods which she owned before iiarriage; and
the small annuity of $40 a year, or about eleven cents a day, to
feed and clothe her, to find medical attendance and nursing for
her when sick, and to bury her decently when she died. If, as
has happened, she should find herself a solitary widow, without
children, at the advanced age of seventy, sach a pittance leaves
her to be an object of private charity or public relief. To say
that she was bound when the contract was proposed to exercise
her judgment, that she ought to have taken advantage of the
opportunity that existed to obtain information, and that if she
did not do so it was her own fault, is to suggest what would be
revolting to all the better feelings of woman's nature. To have
instituted inqliries into the property and fortune of her betrothea
would have indicated that she was actuated by selfish and inter
ested motives. She shrank back from the thought of asking a
single question. She executed the paper without hesitation and
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without inquiry. She believed that he would propose nothing
but what was just, and she had a right to exercise that confidence. She lived with him seventeen years, for aught that
appears, as an affectionate and faithful helpmeet, and no doubt
largely assisted in accumulating the fortune, at least of $15,000,
of which he died in possession according to the evidence. We
think there was error in the charge, and accordingly
Judgment reversed, and venirefacias de novo awarded.

Supreme Court of .Pennsylvania.
CHRISTIAN KOENIG v. ANNA R. SMITH.
A trust created before the Act of 1848 to protect a married woman's property
from her husband, to determine in case she surevfes him, is determined by a divorce
a vinculo.

" THIs was a petition, filed by Anna R. Smith in the Orphans"
Court of Berks county, to compel the plaintiff in error, who *as
her trustee under the will of her father, to file'an account and
pay over the funds in his hands.

By his will, made in 1845, the father of the appellee made
provision for the conversion of all his personal estate into money,
and for the disposition of all his realty, at certain stipulated
'prices. He then directed that the proceeds of all his real and personal estate should be equally divided among all his children, or
their heirs,. except that his daughter Nancy, the appellee, sho u ld
receive- $200 less than either of the others. But as she was then
intermarried with Thomas Smith, in view of her coverture the
testator added the following: "I authorize and empower Christian Koenig, of Bern township, as trustee over all the full share
and legacy and property which I may give unto my daughter
Nancy. And I do hereby give and bequeath into the hands of
said trustee, for the use and benefit of my said daughter Nancy
and her children, the house and lot situate opposite Drrah
Young's steam-mill, in Maiden Creek township, Berks county,
which I bought at sheriff's sale, which property shall be put unto
her for the same as it cost me, and the balance of her legacy shall
be put on interest for my said daughter, and the interest is to be
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paid to her every year during her life, and after her decease, the
house and lot of ground, and the principal sum or balance of her
legacy aforesaid, is to go to her children. But if my daughter
Nancy should survive her husband Thomas Smith, in such case I
order and direct her trustee to overturn and assign all and everything coming to her as legacy and bequest in this will mentioned,
to her and her heirs and assigns for ever."
In 1856 Nancy Smith, the appellee, was divorced from her
husband, the said Thomas Smith, a vinculo matrimonii, and the
question was raised in this record, whether she is entitled to have
her interest under her father's Will transferred to her absolutely.
The trustee, Christian Koenig, resisted such a transfer for the
reason that Thomas Smith, though not now her husband, was still
living.
The court below decreed an account and transfer as prayed in
the petition, whereupon the trustee appealed to this court.
J. S. Livingood, for appellant.-Th'e will makes the law of
this case, and neither Anna Smith nor her husband could by any
act of theirs alter that law. The will gave the share of Nancy
to her children after her death, subject only to the contingency
that she survived her husband, a contingency that has not happened. The divorce cannot affect the rights oe- the children.
The appellee and her former husband may remarry, and. then she
would be in possession.of the property in direct violation of the'
will.
The cases cited by the appellee's counsel are cases where the
cestui que trust died, and the discoverture was therefore permanent.
B. Frank Boyer, for appellee.-The trust was created for a
special purpose, and when this purpose is satisfied the trust ceases:
Steacy v. Bice, 3 Casey 75. The purpose was to protect
appellee's property from her husband, and on her becoming discovert by his death she was to have it absolutely. A divorce
places the wife in the same situation as to her property as if the
husband had died. There is no difference in principle whether
the marriage is dissolved by death or by the sentence of the law ;
in either case she becomes a single woman: Kintzinger's Estate,
2 Ashmead 455; Leggi v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99; Fink v. Hake, 6
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Watts 131; Rlory v, Becker, 2 Barr 470; lNilthnore v. Jvilti.
more, 4 Wright 156 ; Anstey v. Manners, Gow N. P. 10.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-[After stating the facts.]

It cannot be doubted

that the trust was created for a single purpose. That was, to
protect the property given at first absolutely to Mrs. Smith,
against her husband. When the will was made, the Act of 1848,
known as the Married Woman's Law, had no existence. Had the
trust not been created, as the law then stood, Thomas Smith
would have been entitled to all the personal property and to the
usufruct of the realty. The trust could have had no other object
than to guard against this. It was not to support a remainder tor
the children of the testator's daughter, for" he gave at first the
absolute ownership to her, and then, after having organized the
trust, directed that the property- should be assigned to her in fee
without regard ta any remainder in her children, if she survive?
her husband. But if the sole purpose of the trust was to protect
the wife's estate against her husband, it is manifest that purpose
was fully accomplished when the coverture ceased. The divorce
of the partiis terminated all *possibility of the husband's interference" with the property bequeathed and -devised to the wife,, as
completely as his death would have done. Then why should the
trust be continued after its-exigencies have been met ? It matters
not what may be the nominal duration of an estate given by -will
to a -trustee. It continues in equity no longer than the thing
sought to be secured by the trust demands. Even a devise to
trustees and their heirs will be cut down to an estate for life,"or
even for years if such lesser estate be sufficient for the purpose
of the trust. See Hill on Trustees 239, et seq., where many
cases are collected. There can b-e no doubt tlat a trust for the
separate jise of a married woman 6eases on the dbath of her busband, or on her divorce from him, and this though vested in
terms in the trustee in fee, and though he be required to collect
and pay over the rents and interest, not because such a trust is.
not an active one, but'because it is special, and either the death
or divorce renders its continuance, unnecessary. If then the
trust in Christian Koenig was instituted, as we think the will
clearly shows, solely to protect the appellee's property against
her husband, it terminated when by the divorce it became.useless
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as a means of such protection. The appellee is therefore entitled
to a transfer of the property to her.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.

Sutpreme Court of Indiana.
EDMUND T. BAINBRIDGE v. THOMAS SHERLOCK ET AL.1
The Ohio river being a great navigable highway between states, the public haye
1.11the rights that by law appertain to navigable streams, as against riparian
3wners.
But the public rights are upon the river-not upon the banks.
The title of the riparian owner extends to low-water mark.
The right to use the river as a highway does not imply the right to use the
banks for the purposes of landing, to receive and discharge freight and passengers.
Except in cases of peril or emergency, the navigator has no legal right to land
without consent of the riparian owner, at places other than those that have in some
way become public landing-places.
Riparian owners may extend wharves to, and into the navigable portion of, the
rsver, provided they do not unnecessarily obstruct navigation:
Whoever would maintain a wharf for the accommodation of any particulaclass of vessels, should possess a suflicient water-front to contain that class of vessels, without obstructing access to the lands of contiguous proprietors.
A wharf-boat moored to the shore, is entitled to the bame immunity from trespass. or obstruction by vessels navigating the river, as is the laud itself to which
the wharf-boat is moored.
The navigator landing at one wharf with permission of the wharfinger, is not
justified by any public right in the river, in so lasiding and mooring his vessel, as
that while landed its side and stern will be carried: by the current against the
wharf-boat of a contiguous wharfinger lower down the river, thereby obstructing
access to the lower wharf.
APPEAL

from the Jefferson Circuit Court.

Jere. Sullivan and ffendrieks, Hord & Hendricks, for appellant.
C. E. Walker, for appellee.
GREGORY, C. J.-There are errors and cross-errors assigned,
but all the questions involved turn upon the nature and extent
of the rights of the riparian owner along the Ohio river.

I We are indebted to the courtesy of Hendricks, Hord & Hendricks, Esqrs.,
eounsel for appellants, for this case.-EDs. Am. LAW. REG.

BAINBRIDGE v. SHERLOCK.

The appellant owns real estate in the city of Madison, bordering on the river. The river-front of this property extends from
the west line of West street two squares down the river. This
river-front is graded from the top of the bank to the water line,
and is known as wharf property. For many years the appellant
has kept upon this property a wharf-boat, subservient to the uses
of river na-rigation and commerce. For the use of it, he receives,
from steamers and other water-craft navigating the river, from
$3 to $25 for each landing, depending 6n the length of time aboat remains at the wharf, and the amount of business done.
Two other public wharves are maintained at Madison, viz., the
"Roe Wharf," extending from the eastern line of West street up
the river, 168 feet to the west line of an alley, and the "City
Wharf," extending from the east line of thit alley up the river,
168 feet to Mulberry street. West street is 60 feet wide , it is
-the principal .thoroughfare leading from the steamboat landing up
into the, city.
The appellant keeps his wharf-boat below West street, upon
and near the upper end of his wharf property. This location is
convenient to the mouth of West street. The water is not as
good for la-ding below as at the plaintiff's wharf. The wharfboat at the " Roe Wharf" is kept at the lower end of that wharf
property, upon or immediately above the east line of West street.
By placing the Roe wharf-boat at that place, it also is near the
moutli of West street, and is also in better water for the appr6ach
of steamers.
The appellees, the Cincinnati and Louisville Mail Line Company, have? for many years, owned and run a daily line 'of
steamers each way,,and during a great portion of the time they
have run- a double daily line of boats each way. For several
years past all these boats have landed at the Roe wharf, making,
usually, four landings each day, Sometimes a loat thus landed
would remain two hours, but ordinarily, from a quarter to a, half
an hour.
The results of this. arrangement, so far hs concerned the plaintil , were that very frequently his wharf-boat was struck. and
broken, and thrown out of 'water by defendants' steamers, thus
causing direct pecuniary damage; and that constantly, at least
twice, and usually four times a day, the laige boats of the defendants rested upon plaintiff's wharf, lap-ping over and covering
VOL. XVI.'--46
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up from one-third to one half of his wharf-boat. While his wharf.
boat was thus occupied by defendants' steamers, no other boat
could land at it without first pushing them out into the river,
occupying from five to ten minutes each time. Another result
of this arrangement was, and necessarily would be, that transient
steamers approaching the plaintiff's wharf, but finding it thus
obstructed, would, whenever there was sufficient water, pass up
outside, and land at an unobstructed rival wharf above.
The evidence given, and that offered by the appellant, and
ruled out by the court below, tended strongly to show that the
plaintiff was damaged by this mode ofr landing. Is this, in legal
sense, an injury, or is it'damnum absque injuriaP The solution
of this question is the turning-point of the case.
The inquiry that meets us at the threshold is, what are the
rights of the navigator of this river, to the use of its banks and
margins ? The Ohio river is a great navigable highway between.
states, and the public have all the rights that by law appertain
to public rivers as against the riparian owner. But there is no
"shore" in the legal sense of that term-that is, a margin between
high and low tide-the title to which is common, The banks
belong to the riparian owner, and he owns an absolute fee down
to low-water mark: Stinson v. Butler and Others, 4 Blackford
285.
In Ball v. Herbert, 3 Term 253, the question considered 'was
whether there existed a common-law right to- use the banks of the
river Ouze for tow'ing boats. That was a navigable river, and in
the state of navigation then existing, the .right thus to use the
banks was essential. But all the judges 'concurred in holding
that no such right existed at common law.
In Blundell v. Catterall, 5 Barn. & Aid. 268 (7"Eng. Coin.
Law 125), determined in the King's Bench in 1821, the question
was, as to whether or not the public had a common-law right of
bathing in'the sea, and, as incident thereto, of crossing the shore
for that purpose. This led to a very general consideration of the
subject of public and riparian rights, the result of which was a
denial of the right claimed.
Justice HOLROYD, after recognising the public right of passage
over the sea and over navigable rivers, says: 1 These rights are
noticed by Lord HALE; but whatever further rights, if any, they
have in the sea or navigable rivers, it is a very different ques-
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tion, whether they have, or how far they have, independently of
necessity or usage, public rights upon the shore (that is to say,
between high and low water mark), when it is not sea or covered
with water, and especially when it has from time immemorial been,
or has since become, private property. For the purpose of the
king's subjects getting upon the sea and upon the navigable
rive'rs to exercise their unquestionable rights of commerce, intercourse, and fishing, there are not only the ports of the kingdom.
established from time to time by the king's prerogative, and
called by Lord HALE the Ostia .egni; but also public places
for embarking and landing themselves and their goods. It was
not by common law, nor is it by statute, lawful to come -with' or
land -or ship customable goods in creeks' or havens, or other
places out of the ports, unless in cases of danger or necessity,
nor fish or land goods not customable, where the shore or the
land adjoiniAg is private property, unless upon the person's own
soil or with the leave of the owner thereof, who, Lord HALE
says, may, in such case, take amends for the trespass in unloadbig upon his ground, though he may not take it as certain. common toll.
*
*
*
*
,,
The public common-law rights, too, with respect to the sea, &c.,
independently of usage, are rights upon the water, not upon the
land, of passage and fishing on the sea and on the sea-shore, when
covered with water; and, though as incident thereto, the public
must have the means of getting to and upon the waters for these
purposes, yet it will appear that it is by and from such placda
only as. necessity or usage has appropriated to those purposes,
and not a general right of lading, unlading, landing, or embarking where they please upon the sea-shore or the land adjoining
thereto, except in case of peril or necessity.
*
*
*
As to the owner's right to improve the shore, it is laid down that
the king cannot grant a right to lade or unlade on the ripa or bank,
without the owner's consent. There cannot, therefore, be any
common-law right to lade or unlade on the .quay or shore, or land
adjacent in the port. ..
*
Lord HALE
notices and establishes the public right of navigating and fishink
upon and in the water, and the right of resort to the -ports, and
of lading and unlading, landing and embarking therein, either at
the public places appointed, or by usage established for those pur
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poses, or with consent, upon the land, either of the king or of
individuals, but no further."
Justice BAYLEY, referring to a passage from Bracton, in his
opinion, says: "The word I'ripa,' here applies to rivers and
ports, and probably also to the land above the high-watermark,
and if it does, is this the law of England ? Have all persons the
right to fasten a ship to the banks of a river, or have they a right
to tie ropes to the trees, or to land goods on the bank of every
navigable river? The case of Ball v. Herbert, 8 Term Rep. 262,
is not a distinct authority upon this point, inasmuch as in that
case the right of towing- was claimed. But the general question
as- to the right of the public on the 'oa of a navigable river was
discussed, and the court appears to have been of the opinion that
the riva of a navigable river was not publici jurs,-and they
therefore virtually overruled the authority of Bracton."
Mr. Washburn, in his work on Easements, states the law on'
this subject thus: "In regard to the riglit to land upon other
points upon th.e banks of a navigable stream, than those which
have in some way becom public landings, the law would seem to
confine it to cases of necessity, where, in the proper exercise of
the right of passage upon the stream of water, it became unavoidable that one should make use of the bank for landing upon, or
fastening his craft to, in the prosecution of hiis passage :" Washburn on Easements and Servitudes 484, 2d ed.
T]Ie Supreme Court of the United States, in Dutton v 'Strong,
1 Black 23,recognise the right of the riparian owner to erect for
private use a pier extending into the lake, which served the
purpose both of a landing-place for freight, and for its stowage.
The Ohio river is a great highway between states under national sanction, yet we suppose that it would not be in conflict
with the authority of the general government, for this state,
within her territorial limits, to provide for and regulate by law
public landing-places along its shore for the benefit of trade and
commerce, and for this purpose, to exercise the right of eminent
domain.
The right to the use of the river as a highway for passage is
distinct from the right to land for the purpose of receiving and
discharging freight and passengers. The former is secured to
the public, the latter must be exercised with reference to the
rights of the riparian owner.
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The river being public and its banks being private, it is not
difficult to discover the true foundation of these riparian rights,
known as wharf-rights. It is essential to the successful prosecution of his business that the navigator shall make frequent landings, to lade and unlade, to receive and discharge passengers,
and to receive supplies. But except in case of some peril oi
emergency of navigation, he cannot Mius land without the conseni
of the riparian owner, and in return for the privilege of landing,
a reasonable compensation may be demanded. This is the origin
of wharfage.
- -In Bluidell v. Caterall, supra, BEST, J., who dissented from
the opinion of the court denying the common-law right of bathing
in the sea, in the course of his opinion says-:"The owner of the soil of the shore may alao erect such buildings or other things as are necessary for the carrying on of
commerce and navigation, on any parts of the shore that may be
conveniently used for such erections, taking care to impede, as
little as possible, the public right of way. This is not more inconsistent with a public right of way over it than the right of
'digging- a mine under -a road or the erecting of a wharf on a
river are in'consistent with the right of way along such road or
iiver. The former does not interfere with the use of the road;
and although the latter, in.order to be useful, must be carried
aut beyond the high-water mark, and while the. tide is up, must
Bomewhat narrow the passage of the river; yet such wharves are
necessary for the loading and unloading -of vessels, and the right
of passage must be accommodated to the right of loading and
anloading the craft that pass."
"
Chief Justice ABBOTT, in the course of his opinion in the same
case, says: "By what law can any quay or wharf be made ?
These, in order to be useful, must-be below the high-water mark,
that vessels or boats may float-to them when the tide is in. * * *
And it is to be observed that wharves, quays and embankments,
and intakes from the sea, are matters of public as well as of
private benefit."
In the case of Dution y. Strong, 1 Black 23, above cited,.the.
court say: "Wharves, quays, piers, and lauding-places .for the
loading and unloading of vessels, were constructed in the navigable waters of the Atlantic States, by riparian proprietors, at a
very early period in colonial times ; and,. in point of fact, the
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right to build such erections, subject to the limitations before
mentioned, has been claimed and exercised by the owner of the
adjacent land, from the first settlement of the country to the
present time."
These wharves, if they would subserve the only purpose for
which they exist, must approach at least to the edge of that portion of the river that is practically navigable. The right to
place and maintain them even beyond this point, provided they
do not unnecessarily obstruct navigation, is a well-established
incident to riparian title. The wharf-boat is entitled to the same
immunity from trespass or obstruction by vessels navigating the
river as the land itself.
If a navigator lands without authority, on a barren bank, he is
technically a trespasser for trampling over the pebbles. But
incident to the ownership of that barren bank, is a vested right
of great possible value-the right to hire it for the incidental use
of navigation, whenever and wherever a developed river commerce
may bring it iato demand. The. wharf-boat represents this right
or privilege in its condition of beneficial development. It would
be but an idle benefit to the proprietor, if the law protected him
only against technical trespass upon the naked bank, but refused
to protect him in the customary exeicise and enjoyment of the
only right that makes his title to the bank especially valuable.
If the navigator cannot lay his boat in invitum against the
soil, or obstruct the proprietor's access to the river, still less
should he be allowed thus to use the wharf-boat. The very right
that in the first case would be but technically violated, would, in
the second case, be actually and substantially invaded. It is
impossible to conceive of a wharf-right without an incidental
right of access. Iu Irwin v. .Dizion, 9 Howard 83, the court
say: "From the very nature of wharf property, likewise, the
access must be kept open for convenience of the owner and his
So, also, it is impossible to conceive of a wharfcustomers."
right without an incidental right to use a reasonable water space
in front of it for the purpose of mooring vessels landing at the
wharf. Of course that water space, when not actually occupied
by boats, may be freely traversed by vessels navigating the river
under the gendral public right; but it cannot be used as against
the wharf proprietor and without his consent as mooring-ground
for vessels. One cannot properly be said to own a wharf for any
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1 'arti~ular class of vessels, unless he has in front of and contiguous to his own soil, sufficient mooring-ground for that class of
vessels. This right to an appropriate space for mooring-ground
i5, in principle, precisely the same thing as the easement known
Pasdock-room or dockage, appurtenant to the more elaborate and
expensive wharf structures found in commercial seaports, and
this .right or easement has been repeatedly recognised by judicial
determination.
Washburn on Easements, p. 481, has this passage: "So, a
party obstructed in the use of a stream as a highway, may himself remove it, as was held where one fastened a raft of logs to
the bank in such a manner as to prevent another from landing at
his own wharf in a boat."
Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125, was a case involving the
consideration of riparian rights. Judge ]IANNING, in his opinion
in the case, says: ."Wharves and piers are almost as necessary
to navigation 'as vessels and ship-yards, or the places for the construction of vessels, are indispensable. * * * It seems to
me on principle as well as reason, that the owner of the shore has
a right to use the adjacent bed of the lake for such purposes."
MARTIN, -0. J., in his opinion in that case, says: "-They
(riparian owners) have the right to construct wharves, buildings,
and other improvements, in front of their lands, so long as the
public servitude is not thereby impaired.: They are a part of the
realty to which they are attached, and pass with it. Certainly
no one can occupy for his- individual purposes the water in front
of such riparian proprietor, and the attempt of any person to do
so would be a trespass."
The theory on which the case at bar was tried in the court
below, was substantially this: That in the exercise of their rights
as navigators, the defendants might land upoh and obstruct the
plaintiff's wharf as much as they pleased, provided they- did it
carefully, skilfully, and that, no matter to what extent the plaintiff was actually damaged, he could not be deemed as legally
injured.

The -,court erred iri-the instructions given and in those refused.
The defendants are presumed to know the natural rdsult of
their own acts. They had daily experience to show them that a
landing at the "Roe wharf" would result in injury to the plaintiff. As navigators of the Ohio river, trey had no right to land

728

BAINBRIDGE v. SHERLOCK.

on the wharf of the plaintiff, unless by his consent. The defend
ants were trespassers for each act of injury to the plaintiff caused
by landing their boats. The court should have so instructed the
jury. The evidence offered by the plaintiff, tending to show the
extent of this injury, ought to have been admitted. It was not
competent for the plaintiff to prove the amount of damage by the
opinion of experts, but this must be determined by the jury from
all the facts; the value of the right, the disturbance of that right,
the value of the right subject to the injury caused by the unlawful acts of the defendants, are matters proper to go to the jury.
The court below erred in overruling the appellant's motion for a
new trial.
In our view of the case, it is unnecessary to pass upon the
effect of the special findings of the jury on the general finding.
Substantial justice requires a new trial.
It is assigned, as cross-error, that the court erred in overruling
the demurrers to the several paragraphs of the complaint. The
objection take n to each paragraph is the lack of an averment
that the plaintiff himself was guilty of no negligence.
The first paragraph of the complaint avers that defendants,
"without leave, wrongfully entered" upon the lands described,
owned by plaintiff, and continuously used, took possession of and
broke the wharf-boat of the plaintiff, on, attached to, and -con.
nected with the land.
Te second paragraph avers that plaintiff was the owher; &c.,
of a certain wharf-boat, attached and annexed to the samie lands,
and that defendants, on the 1st of June 1857, and daily and continuously thereafter, ran their steamers upon and against the
plaintiff's wharf-boat, thereby damaging it..
The fourth paragraph avers the ownership of the land and the
wharf-boat, and a prescriptive right to keep a wharf appurtenant
to the land. That defendants, with their boats, unnecessarily and
continuously struck against and damaged the wharf-boat and
obstructed the passage to and from it; and that they unnecessarily and without cause, occupied the river in front of the wharf,
interrupting and preventing ingress and egress.
The complaint is good, and the court below committed no error
in overruling the demurrer. This case does not belong to that
class of cases in which it is necessary to aver that the plaintiff
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was without fault. A custom existing at other places could have
nothing to do with the rights of the appellant.
Judgment reversed with costs; cause remanded with
directions to grant a new trial and for further proceedings.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
McDANIELS, EXECUTOR, &c., v. McDANIELS.
Conversations had with jurors about the case on trial by the friends of the prevailing party, intended and calculated to influence the'verdict, constitute a su.fi.
cient cause to warrant the court in granting a new trial, even though not shown to,
have influenced the verdict in point of fact, and though they were had without the
procurement or knowledge ofthe prevailing party, and listened to by the jurorswithout understanding that they were guilty of misconduct in so doing
A motion for a new trial, upon the ground of misconduct by jurors during- the
trial, need not contain an averment that the misconduct was unknown to the moving party before the jury retired. It would seem to be otherwise when the objection to the juror is some matter whichexisted before the trial commenced, and
which might have been a cause for challenge.
The fact that the moving party neglected to inform the court, before the jury
retire&, of misconduct on the part of jurors during the trial which came to his
knowledge, would not, if proved, necessarily, as a matter of law, defeat the motion
for a new trial, but would be one circumstance to be considered with others by the
court in determining whether, in their discretion, to set aside the verdict.

APPEAL from the prpbate of an instrument purporting to be the

last will and testament of James Mclcaniels, deceased.- The case
was tried by jury, at the September Term of the Rutland County
Court, A.D. 1866,- upon the issue joined upon the plea, that the
instrument is not the last will and.testament of-the deceased, and
a verdict was rendered for the proponent. After verdict, and
before judgment, a motion was filed by the defendant to set aside
the verdict for several causes, among which was the following:
"For that some of the panel of jurors, after they were impannelled, and during the progress of the trial, and out of court,
were talked to and with; upon the subject of said cause,*and
favorably to the proponent, by the agents, emissaries, and
friends of Isaac McfDaniels, and by them were urged and soli.
cited, and influenced by improper conversations with said jurors,
or in their presence, to render a verdict in favor 'of the propo-
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nent." This motion was supported by accompanying affidavits.
Further testi mony was taken and filed by both parties, and at an
adjourned session of the County Court, PECK, J., presiding, the
verdict was set aside for the cause above assigned,-to which
decision the proponent excepted. The exceptions were allowed,
subject to the opinion of the Supreme Court whether exceptions
will lie in such a case. The exceptions set forth that the court
found that the conversations detailed in the affidavits were had
with, and in the presence of the jurors who tried the cause, during the trial, and that several of the persons holding such conversations, were tie friends of the proponent, and that they held
such conversations for the purpose of influencing the verdict of
the jury in his favor; that this was done without the procurement
of either the proponent or the defendant, and without the knowledge of the proponent. And the court did not find that it was
done with the knowledge of the defendant. It was also found'
that the conversations were of a character 'directly calculated to
influence the verdict in favor of the proponent.
The.court did not find any corruption, or intentional misconduct in- any of the jurors, but did find that some of the jurors
were guilty of impropriety in suffering conversations to be held
with them, and in their presence and hearing.
The counsel for the proponent contended that the court could
not legally set. aside the verdict; and particularly because it was
not sit forth in the motion, nor in the affidavits sustaining the
same, that the defendant had no knowledge of the conversations
when they occurred, and before the jury ietired to consider the
verdict. But the court held this not to be in law essential.
-E. Edgerton and -Daniel.oberts, for the plaintiff.-1. As a
general proposition, it may be said, that the setting aside of a
verdict, and the granting of a new trial, rests in the discretion
of the County Court, to which no exception lies. But this discretion is not unrestrained license. It is limited by legal principles and legal rules. It depends, both as to its exercise at alli
and, in a degree, as to the mode of its exercise, upon the facts
found. So far as the decision below can be resolved into a legal
conclusion from the facts found and stated upon the record, it is
subject to revision: Joyal v. Barney, 20 Vt. 159-160; Briggs
v. Georgia, 15 Id. 61; French v. Smith et al., 4 Id. 863.
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2. The court reports, that the conversations referred to "were
af a character directly calculated to influence the verdict in favor
of the plaintiff," but does not find that the verdict was thus influenced ; that there was no "corruption nor intentional misconduct in any of the jurors ;" and that those conversations were
had "without the procurement of the plaintiff, and without his
knowledge." Courts will not visit the consequences of an irregularity upon an unoffending party, unless it appear that it has
wrought some injury to the other party': Dennison v. Powera,
35 V . 39; Downer v. Baxter, 30 Id. 167 ; Blaine v. Chambers,
1 S. & R. 169 ; 2 Grah. & Wat. N. T. 309, 810, 312, 317 ; Shea
v. Lawrence, 1 Allen 167.
3..This 'was not a proper case for the exercise of any discre'
tionary action of the court, inasmuch as it must be assumed that
the defendant knew of the matters complained of, at the time
of their occurrence, and did not bring them to the knowledge of
the court beford the verdict, but lay quiet, speculating upon the
chance of a verdict in his favor.
. On this point the case states the non-finding of the court.
"The court did not fina that it was done with the knowledge of
the defendanit"-thus distinguishing between this and the positive
finding in respect to the plaintiff's knowledge.
Clearly the tendency of the testimony was to prove this knowledge on the part of the defendant.
But to warrant setting aside the verdict, it should be both
stated in the motion and be proved affirmatively, that the defendant did not know of the matter complained of before the rendition of the verdict: Brunshill v. Giles, 9 Bing. 13; Herbert v..
Shaw, 11 Mod. 118; State v. Camp, 23 Vt. 551; Jameson v.
Androscoggin Railroad,52 Me. 412 ; Pettibonev. Phelps et at.,
13 Conn. 445; Selleok v. Sugar Rollow T. o., Id. 452; Woodruff v. Richardson, 20 Id. 237; 2 Grah. & Wat. N. Trials 303,
575.
Carles . Dewey and A. Potter, for the defendant.-I.
Exceptions will not lie, and the case should be remanded ....
a. The court found the fact that the persons guilty of tampering were the friends of the proponent.
b. That the conversations were of a chariacter directly calculated to influence the verdict of the jury in favor of the proponent.
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*c. That they were held for the purpose of influencing the verdict of the jury in his favor.
d. That the jurors were guilty of impropriety in suffering such
conversations with them, and in their presence and hearing.
e. And that the conversations were in violation of law.
II. As a motion for a new trial, for causes dehors the record,
is and must be addressed to the discretion of the court, the de.
cision cannot be revised on exceptions, unless, indeed, it be for
the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or when it is
apparent the decision is based upon. a false legal assumption:
Sheldon v. Perkins, 37 Vt. 557; Shea v. Lawrence, 1 Allen

169; White v. Wood, 8 Oush. 415; 2 Gra. & Wat. 47, n. 4.
It has never been held, or everi claimed, that jurorg' depositions
may not be received to prove the misconduct of the parties or of
persons acting in their behalf: Ritchie v. Halbrooke, 7 S. & R.
458.
III. 1. It is not essential that the tampering be done by the
party himself, nor by his procurement. It is sufficient if it be
done by his friends and in his behalf: Deacon v. Shreve, 2 Zab.
176 ; Coster v. Hlerest, 3 Brod. & Bing. 272 ; Knight v. Freeport,
13 Mass. 218; Shea v. Lawrence, 1 Allen 169; Brunson v.
Graham, 2 Yeates 166; Pleas of the Crown, vol. 2, p. 308;
Gra. & Wat. vol. 2, p. 298, et seq.
2. And even if the attempt to bias the jury be made by strangers,
the verdict will be set aside if there is fair ground for belief that
it has been influenced thereby: Gra. & Wat. vol. 2, p. 809.
3. So, in the class of very numerous cases, where papers have
been delivered to the jury by mere mistake, the verdicts have
been set aside, whenever the papers had .any tendency to bias
them: Whitney v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405 ; Vin. Abr., Trial,pl.
18 ; rii v. Drury, 5 Pick. 296 ; Sargent v. Roberts, 1 Id. 337.
4. The same rule obtains, and verdicts will be set aside: 1.
Where jurors are allowed to separate before a verdict is agreed
upon, if the separation is attended with the slightest suspicion
of abuse: Oliver v. Trustees of Pres. Church, 5 Cow. 283;
Horton v. Horton, 2 Id. 589. 2. Where a juror gives private
information to his fellows, material to the issue, which may have
influenced them: Sam v. The State, 1 Tenn. 61. 3. Where
j.urors re.examine witnesses who have already testified: Met.
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calf v. Dean, 2 Bay 94; Perine v. Van Note, 1 South. 146;
Bedington v. Southall, 4 Price 232.
It thus appears from the authorities above cited, and many
others to be found in the books, that the ground upon which
courts set aside verdicts for improper attempts to influence the
jury, is not merely and only the misconduct of the party, but
the' possibility that the unlawful attempt, by whomsoever made,
or with whatever motive, may have inoculated the verdict with
vice or error.
IV. 1. It is a corollary of the preceding proposition,
already incidentally discussed, that it need not affirmatively
appear that the verdict was injuriously affected by the .tampering. - If the purity of the verdict might have been affected, it
will be set aside. And this rule has been adhered to-with great
rigor and tenacity: Whitney v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405 ; Cohen v.
Robert, 1 Strob. 410; Perkins v. Knight, 4 N. H. 474; Hare
v. The State, 4 How. (Miss.) 187; Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick.
496 ; Com. v. Wormley, 8 Grat. 712 ; COuster v. Merest, 8 Brod.
&Bifig. 272; Knight v. Freeport, 13 Mass. 218; Gra. & Wat.
vol. 2, p. 3Q0; Bix v. Drury, 5 Pick. 286.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The motion for a new trial was properly granted.
t was not incumbent upon the moving party to show that the
-verdict was, in point of fact, influenced by the unlawful conversations.' It is quite enough that, in a 'doubtful case, conversations with the jurors have been had during the progress of the
trial for the purpose of influencing and 'directly calculated 'to
influence them to, render just the verdict they did. There is no
practicable method to so analyze* the mental .operations of the
jurors as to determine whether, in point of fact, the verdict
would have been the same if the trial had been conducted, as
both parties had a right to expect, according. to law and upon
the evidence in court. If the court, in their instructions to the
jury, err, with respe.ct to some proposition of law, it is 'well
understood that the right of the defeated party, on exceptions fo
a new trial, does not depend on his showing that the error actually influenced the verdict. It is enough, if its natural tendency
is to influence the jury to render their verdict against him, and
such may reasonably have been its result. The right to a cor
,STEELE,
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rect charge from the court is no more sacred or important "than
the right which, in this case, was violated. The analogy might
be carried farther. It is not essential to the right to a new trial,
on exceptions, that the error of the court should have been intentional, or by the fault of the prevailing party. So, in this case,
the defendant was not any the less likely to be injured because
the jurors did not appreciate the impropriety of tamely listening
to conversations intended to influence them, or because the plaintiff was unaware of the officious efforts of his friends on his behalf. The friends of the plaintiff whq thus approached the jury
were guilty of a flagrant violation of the law, and the jurors who
suffered themselves to be so approached, though they may have
meant no wrong, were guilty, not only of a violation of the law,
but also of the oath they had taken to say nothing to any person
about the business and matters in'their charge but to theirfellowjurors, and to suffer no one to speake to them about the same but
in court. Both were liable to severe and -summary punishment.
The plaintiff, as he was unaware of these transactions, is not
liable to punis'hment, but it does not follow from this that he can
hold a verdict which is the result of a trial corrupted, though
without his fault, by a shameful disregard of the familiar rules
which are necessary to a decent administration of the law. The
court set the verdict aside, not as a punishment to any one, but
in justice to themselves, as well as to the defendant, that the trial
may- be conducted fairly so that the verdict, when finally rendered, may be entitled'to the respect of both parties and the confidence of the court as the result of a trial substantially according to law, and upon the evidence in court. It is true that a
verdict should not be set aside for every trifling error of law by
the court, or for every trifling misconduct of a juror which occurs
without the fault of the prevailing party, but it should be whenever the error or misconduct renders it reasonably doubtful
whether the verdict has been legitimately procured.
The plaintiff insists that the motion is fatally defective because
it contains no allegation that the defendant had not full knowledge
of the matters complained of before the jury retired to consider
;heir verdict, and that this is a defect which cannot be cured by
proof, and that, even if it could, it has not been in this case, the
court merely stating in the exceptions that they did not find that
the misconduct occurred with the knowledge of the defendant,
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and not stating that they did find that it occurred withotit his
knowledge. We do not think these objections are well taken. It
was not incumbent upon the moving party to either allege or
prove that he had not such knowledge. If the other party could
prove that he had, or if he could prove that he had not, it would
be one fact to be considered, with others, by the court in determining whether, in their discretion, to grant the motion, but the
circumstance that the moving party had such knowledge would
not, as a matter of law, defeat the motion. The case is clearly
and broadly distinguishable, both in reason and authority, from
those in which the objection to the juror is some matter that
existed before the trial. If an objection to a juror exists when
the jury are impannelled, the juror may be challenged and anothei
substituted, and if a party knowing the objection neglects to
challenge, he thereby expresses his satisfaction with the juror.
But where the obje.ction arises from misconduct of the juror
during. the trial, the opportunity for challenge has passed.
Another juror cannot then be substituted and a fair trial thereby
secured. If the juror is dismissed it but results in what is asked
for here-a.fnew trial. A party ought usually to suggest to the
court any serious misconduct of the jurors of which he has positive knowledge, or-entirely reliable information, particularly if
learned early in the trial, as it may result in .an immediate discharge of the jury, and a saving ofmuch time and expense. But
the fact of the misconduct may be denied, and a court "caniot
always interrupt a trial to investigate charges against a juror,
and must exercise very great caution and discretion to be able
to even make inquiries of the jurors with relation to their conduct in such a manner -as to create in their minds no'feeling of
resentmeni toward either party. We cannot hold that the failure
of the party, if proved, to make the suggestion to.the court would
be more than a circumstance to be considered and weighed, with
others, by the court in determining whether, in their discretion,
to grant a new trial.
It is very true that.in two Connecticut cases it has been held
that it is necessary for the party to aver in his motion his ignorance, until after the jury retired, of the misconduct, which
occurred during the trial. But the latter .of these two cases,
Woodruff v. Richardson, 20 Conn. 241, professes to be governed
by the earlier, .Pettibone v. Phelps,13 Conn. 452; and in Petti-
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bone v. Phelps, the court, after stating several very good reasons
why the motion should be denied, merely add, a point not made
by counsel, that the motion is also insufficient for the reason that
it contains no allegation that the misconduct of the juror was
unknown to the plaintiffs before the trial closed, and that it was
,settled in Selleck v. The Sugar Hollow Turnpike Co., 13 Conn.
453, that such an allegation was essential.'. It thus seems that
this doctrine, in Connecticut, originally rests solely upon the
authority of Selleek v. The Sugar Hollow Turnpike Co. Upon
examination of that case, it turns out that the objection there
taken was not at all misconduct by a juror during the trial, but
was a disqualification which existed before the trial, in that the
talesman was not an elector in Connecticut, but a citizen of Neew
York ; and the court hold that if the party knew the fact at the
trial he might have challenged the juror provided he 'did not
choose to waive the disqualification, and that he should have
alleged that he did not know it in order to excuse his not mak.
ing the objection seasonably and regularly. It is clear, there.
fore, that this" case is no authority to warrant the decisions which
professedly rest upon it.
The views which we have expressed are decisive of the matter
before us, and it becomes unimportant to discuss the other questions presented. In the opinion of the court, this case presents
a state of facts in which the court below, in the exercise of their
discretion, not only might without error, but ought. to have'
granted a new trial, and the exceptions to the action of the court
in so doing are overruled and the cause is remanded.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
SOLOMON McREYNOLDS v. THE STATE.'
To constitute the crime of bigamy, there must be a valid marriage subsisting M
the time of the second marriage.
A marriage between slaves was, in legal contemplation, absolutely void; but if
'he parties, after their manumission, continued to cohabit together as husband and
wife, it was a legal assent and ratification of the marriage; and if while such
marriage exists, one of the parties marries another, it is bigamy.

THE plaintiff in error, a free man of color, was indicted at tho
IWe are indebted to Hon. J. 0. Shackelford, for this case.-EDs. Am. LAw
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January Term 1867 of the Circuit Court of Montgomery county
for bigamy. He was arraigned and tried at the same term of the
court before a jury of the county, and. was convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment in the penitentiary of the state.
Motions for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, were entered
and severally overruled, from which he has appealed in error to
thi§-court.

The facts of the case are substantially as follows: In 1856,
the plaintiff in error was a slave, the property of Wilson 0. McReynolds, a citizen of Montgomery county, Tennessee; during
that year the plaintiff in erior and Eliza Elder, a slave, were
married. The marriage rites were solemnized by Fred Martin,
a colred preacher. It was by and with the consent of the owners of the slaveg ; they continued to live to~ether as man and
wife until about the 1st of January 1867. Then the plaintiff.in
error procured license of marriage from the county court clerk
of Montgomery 'county, and the rites of marriage were solemnized between the plaintiff in error and one Betsy Edington, a
-

free woman of color.

On the trial of- the cause, the court summed up.the law of the
case as follows : "If the proof shows the plaintiff in error had,
prior to his freedom, contracted a marriage with a woman of his
color, and lived with her as her husband-in other words, that
the two lived together as man and wife, they are now legally
such; and if the plaintiff in error has married another woman,
while his wife first married was living; he is guilty as charged
in the indictment."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHACKELFORD, J.-This is a novel case, and presents an interesting question, and is one of gfea importance, involving the
domestic relations'of that class of persons who haie been recently
released from the condition- of slaves and given.the rights and
privileges- of'free persons. For the determination of the question involved, it is necessary to look to thL status and conditions
of these persons, while in a state of slavery, and see what rights
and privileges *ere accorded them.. The 'municipal law' did not
recognise the rites of marriage between slaves ; they had ho civil
rights except where the right of freedom wa;s involved, in which
case they could prosecute a suit by their'next friend, or in cases
VOL. XVI.-47
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affecting his life, he was tried as a fr.eeman. Unconditional submission to the will of the master was the duty of the slave. He
was protected in life and limb from his violence. They were
permitted to select their wives, and were often married by a
preacher of their own race; sometimes took up and cohabited
together, and were recognised as husband and wife by thei
owners. They were generally happy and contented in .the
humble condition. The cares of the future did not press upon
them; their wants were supplied by their owners, and their
children provided for. But the institution has ceased, with all
its complications, and they are now given the rights and privileges of citizens.' It has devolved upon the courts the duty of
declaring the rules of law applicable to them in their domestic
relations, growing put of their changed condition. The *slaves
having no civil rights, could they. contract in marriage while in.
a state of slavery so as to be binding upon them after their
emancipation ? Marriage is defined to be a social contract.
Lord ROBINSON, a Scottish judge, in a- passage approvingly
quoted by Judge STORY, and by Bishop, in his work on Marriage
and Divorce, § 6, says, "It is a contract sui generis, differing,
in some respects, from all other contracts, so that the rules of
law, which are applicable in expounding and enforcing other
contracts,-may not apply to this."
The contra'6t of marriage is the most important of all human.
transactions. It is the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized
society. The status of marriage is juris gentium, and the
foundation of it, like that of all other c'ontracts, rests on the
contract of parties; but it differs from other contracts from
this, that the rights, obligations, and duties arising from it are
not left entirely to be regulated by the agreement of the parties,
but are, to a certain extent, matters of municipal regulation,
over which the parties have no control by any declaration of
their will. It confers the status of legitimacy on children born
in wedlock, with all the consequential duties and privileges
thence arising. It gives rise to the relations of consanguinioy
and affinity. In short, it pervades the whole system of civil
society- Unlike other contracts, it cannot, in general amiong
civilized nations, be dissolved by mutual consent, and it subsists
in full force, even although one of the parties should be for -ver
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rendered incapable, as in the case of incurable insanity or the
like, from performing his part of the mutual contract.
In this state the common law was changed, and marriages are
contracted and governed by municipal law. The statute laws
of the state were applicable to free persons, and did not apply to
this class of persons at the time of their marriage when in astate
of slavery. Therefore, there being no statutory law recognising
marriage between slaves, we must look to the common law to see
its effect upon persons who are not within the rule of municipal
law, and be governed in our conclusions by analogous principles.
At common law it is the declared assent of the mind to the act
of marriage which makes it legaL Such as declare their assent
shall, be bound. Though the slave could make no civil contract,
and the municipal law did not recognise the state of marriage
between slaves, and a marriage was, in legal contemplation, absolutely void, and no civil rights could. grow out of such a relation
while in a siatb of slavery, it must be admitted there was the
moral assent of the mind on the part of slaves to a marriage.
They were usually married by one of their own race; and lived
together as man and wife. What is the legal effect of such a
marriage affer manumission, the parties continuing to cohabit as
haan and wife ? By the common Iaw, if a boy under fourteen, or
a girl under twelve years of -ge marries, the marriage is inchoate
and imperfect, and when either of them comes to the age of consent, they may disagree and declare the marriage void without
any divorce or sentence in the spiritual court ; but it is so far a
marriage that if, at the age of consent, they agree to continue
together, they need not be married again: 1 Black. Com. 437.
It is a well'setled rule, where marriages have been entered into,
when one- of the p~arties was laboring under temporary insanity, if
the parties continue to cohabit aftdr a lucid interval, the cohabitation will render their marriage good: Bishop on Marriage and
Divorce, § 140. This principle was settled by this court irthe
case of Cole v. Oble, 5 Sneed 57. The court say, "If the proof
established the wife was of unsound mind ht the. time of the.marriage, there is abunddnt evidence she was afterwards restored, st
least temporarily, and did not repudiate, but her acts and .eonduct
recognised the validity of a marriage. A lunatic, on regaining
his reason, may affirm a marriage celebratedwhile he was insane,
,and this without any new solemnizationi." In support. of this
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principle, the court refer to Bishop, § 189, 6 Metcalf 144. Apply
these principles to the case under consideration. The plaintiff in
error, while in a state of slavery, was married according to the
usage andecustoms of the race. They continued to live together
as man and wife until their emancipation. The relation of hus
band and wife continued until January 1867, when he abandoned
his wife and married another. At common law'we have shown it is
the declared assent of the will to the act of marriage which makes
it legal. Such as declare their assent shall be bound. Though
the plaintiff in error was incapable of making any valid contract
while in a state of slavery, and the marriage was void, and he
could have dissolved the relation as soon as he was capable of
contracting, yet he having continued to live with the woman he
had married in a state of slavery, it was a ratification of the.marriage. Bishop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce, § 162, in
reference to marriage of slaves, says: "If after the emancipa.
tion, the parties live together as husband and wife, and if, before
emancipation, they were married in the form which either usage
or law had established for the marriage of slaves, this subsequent
mutual acknowledgment of each other as husband and wife should
be held to complete the act of matrimony, so ap to make them
lawfully and fully married from the time at which this subsequent
living together commenced;" and in support of this principle he
cites 3 IredelPs Eq. 91 ; 23 Miss. 410 ; Pointer on Marriage and
Divorce 157 ; and the case of Cole v. Cole, 5 Sneed 57. Doubts
existing in the public mind as to the validity of such marriages
while in a state of slavery, the legislature, with a view to elevate
this class of the population in morals, and to keep -hem together
as families who had contracted marriage in a state of slavery, on
the 26th of May 1866, passed an act to define the term free
persons of color, and to declare the rights of such.persons. The
5th section of said act is as follows: "That all free persons of
color who were living together as husband and wife in this state,
while in a state of slavery, are hereby declared to be man and
wife, and their children legitimately entitled to an inheritance in
any property heretofore acquired, or that may be hereafter ac.
quired by said parents, to as full extent as white children are
entitled under existing laws of this state."
The passage of this act did not change or alter the law in
reference to those who were married while in slavery, and con
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tinned to cohabit together as man and wife after their emancipation. The marriage of such persons was made valid by their
consenting to live together after their emancipation; and having
given, while in a state of slavery, a moral assent, as soon as they
were capable of contracting or legally assenting to the marriage,
it xkvould become valid.
The act of the legislature was proper under the circumstances
in which it was passed.. It was supposed this class of persons
were not embraced within the rules of the law regulating marriage. The object of the legislature was to give the sanction
of law, and bring within its rules this class of persons in their
domestic relations.
Such being the principles of law governing this case, was the
court right ? He instructed the jury if the plaintiff in error had
prior to his freedom contracted a marriage with a woman of his
color, and lited with her as husband, and had married another
woman while his wife was living, he would be guilty as charged.
Under this charge, if the plaintiff in error had married another
woman while the wife he had married in a state of slavery was
living, the jury were instructed he was guilty. This is erroneous.
To constitute the crime of bigamy, there must be a valid marriage subsisting at the time of the second, marriage. His honor
should have instructed the jury, if the plaintiff in error had married before his emancipation, and had continued to live andcohabit wi h. his wife he had married while in a state of slavery
after their freedom, it. was a legal assent and rafication of the
marriage, and the plaintiff in error having married anbther while
the first marriage existed, was guilty.
The judgment -of the court, must be reversed, and a new trial
awarded..

Supreme Court of M7chigan.
HOBART v. THE CITY OF DETROIT.
The fact that an artile is patented, does not necessarily prevent any j erson but
the patentee from contracting to supply it; others may do so, taking the risk of
being able to obtain the patentee's license.
Therefore, where a city charter provides that no contracts shall be made by the
city, except with the lowest bidder, after advertisement of proposals, it -does not
prevent the city from contracting for a patented article, such as the Nicholwon
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pavement, although in point of fact the only bidder was the patentee, who held a
monopoly of the article.
APPEAL

in chancery from Wayne Circuit Court.

Moore ,f Griffin, for appellant.

G. r.N. Lothrop, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CooLEY, C. J.-The complainant seeks to enjoin the collection
of a tax levied upon a lot owned by him, for the purpose of paying the expense of paving in front of it with the Nicholson pavement, alleging, as a ground of injunction, that the contract for
such pavement was illegal, and therefore invalid.
The question of :validity arises upon the following"facts:
Section 12 of chapter 8 of the city charter provides as follows:
"1No contract for the purchase of any real estate, or for the
construction of any public sewer, paving, gravelling, planking,
macadamizing; or for. the construction of any public work whatever, or for any work to be done, or for purchasing or furnishing
any material, printing or supplies, for said corporation, if the
purchase of said real estate, or the expense of such construction,
repair, work, material, or supplies shall exceed $200, shall be let
or entered into except to and with the lowest responsible bidder,
with-adequate security * * * and not until advertised proposals
and specifications therefor shall have been duly published in at
least one daily newspaper published in said city, and for such
period as the common council shall prescribe." The right to lay
the Nicholson pavement in Detroit at the time this contract was
let was owned exclusively by the firm of Sinith, Cook & Co., -the
contractorp, who alone, therefore, it is said, could and did bid for
the contract, and there being no possibility of a competitor, the
contract was awarded to them on their own terms. This circumstance of exclusive right, it is claimed, precludes the application
of this provision of the charter to such a contract, inasmuch as
the purpose of the provision, which was to secure open and public competition, could not possibly be accomplished where there
could be but one bidder.
The doctrine of the complainant leads to this conclusion:
That wherever, from the nature of the case, there can be no
competition, the city can make no contract, however important or
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necessary for the interest of the city, since contracts, except by
public letting, are forbidden by the express terms of the statute,
and those by public letting are forbidden by an implication which
is equally imperative. And if applied to this case, however
much this mode of paving may exceed all others in utility, it
cannot be adopted in the city of Detroit, or in any other city
with- the like provision in its charter, even although the proprietors of the patent might be willing to lay it on terms more advantageous to the city than those on which pavement of less value
could be procured.
.To support this conclusion, we must import into the statute a
condition which we must suppose to pervade its spirit, but which
is not expressed by its words. The power which the charter
gives to the common council to cause the streets of the city to
be payed, is conferred by afiother section in very ample termsthe sole condition imposed upon it being the public letting of the
contract to te lowest bidder. The courts, I think, should be
very cautious about importing new terms into a statute in order
to. make it express a meaning which its words do not convey, and
they- ought at least to first make sure that they are not changing
the legilatire intent, and giving the statute an, operation that
the legislature never designed, and perhaps woul& never have
assented to.
The benefits to be anticipated from the public letting of contracts, must vary greatly in the different classes f cases, according to the extent of the competition that is possible, or that can
be excited. If unskilled labor is to be advertised for, or a'work
which is open to all, and all the materials for which ar abundant
at regular market prices, it is evident that everybody may bid,
and the competition be general. But if the work" to be constructed require the constant attendance of a 6cientific overseer,
or if some of the, materials be scarce, and owned by a few persons only, or if the work be so expensive -as to be beyond the
means of most persons according to the terms on which it is to
be constructed, it must be very apparent that in these and many
other cases which can' be supposed, the same full benefits of competition are not always to be obtained, which are'probable inthe
cases first supposed, and that the danger from monopolies and
combinations will be proportionately greater.
It will not be claimed, however, that the city has not authority
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to let contracts in these cases ; and even if two persons only'are
in position to become bidders, it would be conceded that a contract could be lawfully let, even though but one of the two should
actually throw in proposals. The security of the city against
combinations and extravagant contracts in such cases must rest
in the power which the common council possesses to reject any
bid which they might regard as unreasonable-a p6wer which
the legislature have e.vidently considered of some value, as otherwise they would have made the fact of lowest bid conclusive, and
the execution of a contract in accordance with it compulsory.
It is very clear, therefore, that the courts cannot step in and
declare a contract thus publicly let to be void because the antici
pated benefit was not obtained from the competition, if any competition was possible. The statute has fixed a rule from which
great benefit will be derived in many cases, and some benefit in
most cases, and it has declared that contracts shall be valid which
comply with that rule. The rule was made general for the benefits that will generally flow from it ; and the purpose is to attain
those benefits wherever practicable, be they more or less. We
cannot 'declare a contract void on the sole ground that no benefits
followed the application of the rule in that particular case, though
the common council might have refused to enter into it for that
reason if they had seen fit. And if we cannot declare a contract
void because of this result, neither, I think, can we do so because
beforehand the result might be supposed inevitable.
The case was argued as if such a patent right was a thing which
stood by itself, so that very few cases could.be liable to the objection now taken. This, however, is not so. The objection would
be applicable in any case where the city might have occasion to
procure any patented machine,. or to let aiay contract requiring
the use of any invention secured by letters patent. It is true
;hat in the case of machines of known utility, the market will
generally be supplied at regular rates; but it frequently happens
that one person, firm, or corporation alone has them for sale, so
that there is a practical monopoly, even though some of the
machines may be in the hands of individuals who have purchased
them for their own use. Yet unquestionably other persons than
the owners of the right may bid for a contract to supply such
machines, relying, perhaps, on being able to obtain the privilege
of manufacturing them, or upon purchasing them at the rates at
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which they are generally sold. Their contract would be valid,.
notwithstanding they might find it difficult or even impossible to
perform it.
But it is sometimes the case that there is as complete a
monopoly of some material necessary to the performance of a
public contract, as of a patent right the use of which is essential.
It might even happen with a common material, that at a particular emergency all that was within reach, or that could be obtained
within the necessary time for the perfoimance of the contract,
would be owned by a single individual. In such a case, on the
complainant's theory, the public work must be suspended, however necessary and urgent. And as a monopoly in regar? to any
necessary article, however insignificant, would be as fatal as if it
extended to all the material, injunction-bills'of this kind, I fear
would multiply upon us to the great detriment of the city, since
contractors, in making their bids, would be compelled to add
thereto a sum sriflicient to cover the risks of loss from delayed
payments and from possible defeat in a suit in chancery.
. But it is not, I apprehend, strictly correct to say that because
the -patented invention-which must be made use of is awned by
one person exclusively, therefore no one else carl be a bidder.
Every one has a right to bid, and to. take upon himself the risk
of being able to, procure the right to make use of the invention.
Certainly the showing that Smith, Cook & Co. owned the right
to put down the Nicholson pavement in the city of Detroit, does
not go-far enough to show that they alone could bid on a contract
for that purpose. If that firm held the privilege of putting down
the paiement for sale at a regular price per square foot or yaid,
the opportunity to bid for a contract would be as much open to
public competitioi as any other -work requiring skilled labor.
For aught we know this was the- case; and we may well take
notice of the fact-that it, is frequently by thus selling the "roy alty" that the owners of new inventions expect to obtain their
reward. The royalty acquires a sort of market value which
becomes well understood ; and all persons have the benefit of this
market value, just as 'much as they would if the ownership. and
right to control were of such a character -that monopoly would
be impossible. True, the owner may at any time withdraw the
royalty from sale in order to drive hard bargains ; but if he does,
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the public will still retain a security in the power to refuse to
contract with him.
The theory of the complainant is that more than one bid in
this case was impossible. But suppose, in point of fact, Smith,
Cook & Co. had not bid at all, but several other persons having first ascertained at what price they could obtain the royalty,
had entered into a sharp competition for this contract, would it
not have been demonstrated that not only was-more than one bid
possible, but that the very benefits the charter designed to secure
by the public letting had been obtained ? And if this is so, how
can it be said that the fact that a mohopoly of the patent exists
necessarily defeats all cbntracts to which the patent is essential-?
On the theory of the complainant it is easy to imagine cases
in which the court would be placed in the remarkable position
of holding contracts void on the ground that competition was
impossible, and therefore the benefit of the public letting could
not be obtained, when in fact there had been competition, and
the benefit had actually been realized. -I do not believe there is
any mere implication of the law which can force us to this conclu.ioii ; and to my mind it is very clear that the legislature
would not intentionally have so tied up the hands of the city
authorities as to preclude their making use of new and valuable
inventions. I am not therefore disposed to put upon the charter
a forced construction to that efect,, which its terms do not seem
to justify.
I am aware of the contrary decision which, by a divided court,
has been made in Wisconsin in the case of Dean v. Mliarlton, 7
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 564; but, with great respect for the reasons assigned by that court, I am still brought to the conclusion
that the decree of the circuit judge was correct, and it must be
affirmed.
CHRISTAIIcY

and GRAvEs, JJ., concurred.

CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.-I am unable to reconcile the action
of the city with the provisions of its charter. It may be very
desirable to allow such a course to be taken, but the prohibition
seems to me to be very clear, and if this case can be taken out
of it, I do not perceive how in any case the citizens can be pro
tected from the very dangers which the charter was intended to
prevent.
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The charter (chap. 8, § 12) declares that no contract for paving (or various other things), if for more than $200, shall be
let or entered into except to and with the lowest responsible bidder, with adequate security, and not* until advertised proposals
and specifications therefor shall have been duly published in a
daily paper. The same section prohibits contracts with persons
who are in'arrears to the city, as well as some others, and forbids contracts requiring mechanical skill tD bc let to other persons than mechanics.
It cannot be claimed that if the monopoly of the pavement in
question belonged to a public defaulter, or to one who was not a
practical mechanic, any ground of dispensation could he found.
Yet -the necessity for opening the door would be as great in that
case as in any other, if the city needs the improvement. But it
has not been deemed safe to allow a full and free choice, and we
have no power to remit any legislative requirement.
The -clause in question cannot usually create more difficulty
when articles or processes are patented, than in other cases.
The patent laws contemplate that things patented shall be offered
to the public on equal 'terms, and so generally is this done that
the rule of damages for infringement is governed by the price
usually charged. And in most cases, therefore, improvemen tg
requiring the introduction of patented articles or methods, are
as open to general competition as any others. But if a rigid
monopoly is kept up, there can be no competition, and all'the
evils contemplated by the act are introduced. Instead of obtaining the work at the lowest price, it can only be had at- the highest
price which is supposed to fall short of prohibition. instead'of
competing skilful, workmen, those must be employed whom the
patentees see fit to force upon the corporation..
Instead of choice in the quality of materials, it must accept
such as the contractor is willing to engage for. And publication
of proposals must be an empty ceremony when there is no chance
of competition, and when the choice of the patented improve.
ment is practically equivalent to a choice of the contractor at
his own price.

. .-:

The charter was designed, not only to provide against. extravagant prices, but also, as is very clear from.many clausesrto prevent the gpportunity for favoritism and c.orruption in the council.
If there are several different kinds of paving, and only one is
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patented, the patentee, retaining his monopoly, would find it'well
worth his while to be liberal in inducements to select his plan,
and could afford to be all the more liberal because he could
recover back his outlay by enhancing his prices. But those
whose bids were open to competition would, to say the least, stand
on a much less favorable footing. While there is no reason for
imputing any wrong motive in this case, and while I do not believe many public bodies are open to these sinister influences, yet
it is not to be denied that this is one of the dangers in the eye
.of the legislature, and I can conceive of no more fruitful source
of possible inducements to corruption than the monopoly of paving the streets of a large city.
It must not be forgotten that while the adoption of a new style
of paving may be convenient, it can never be necessary. No
patent continues beyond a few years, and a city that is within
fourteen years of the last improvements cannot be very backward in progress. Moreover, the real merits and durability of a
new pavement can never be fully tested very much before the
term of privilege has approached its close. As each new plan is
generally somewhat expensive, its adoption must always require
some consideration. The cost of paving is never a very light
burden, where property is unproductive, and falls heavily upon
many who are not able to bear any needless charges. Those
plans which have been tried and are best known are apt to be
reasonably economical. The charter requires these safeguards
to protect the individual citizen upon whom this ekpense is
charged, and nothing short of necessity can render it expedient
to open the door to unchecked expenditure. I cannot see any
strong reason for assuming that if this very case had been presented to the legislature they would have found in it any occasion for qualifying their language, or for removing the restrictions
they have in terms imposed.
I think the case comes within the spirit as well as the letter
of the charter, and that the injunction should be made perpetual
Judgment affirmed.

GORDON v. STOTT.

United States District Court,Western Districtof .Pennsylvania.
GORDON ET AL. v. STOTT ET AL.'
A party may serve a subpcena on his witnesses, and in cases where he succeeds
t
in the trial redover his costs therefor.
In cases of involuntary bankruptcy and a trial by jury, a docket fee of $20 is
taxable in favor of the counsel of the successful party.
In proceedings in voluntary bankruptcy a docket fee is not taxable, except in
those voluntary cases, whan under the 31st section of-the act the court is authorized
to direct a trial upon specifications of objections to the bankrupt's discharge.
The word trial in the Bankrupt Act means a trial by jury.
STOTT & ALLEN, merchants in Erie, failed in business in the
summer of 1867, and Gordon, McMillan & Co., of Cleveland,
commenced proceedings to force them into bankruptcy, Defendants denie& the allegations in the bill, and made an issue which
was tried by.a jury at last October Term at Pittsburgh. Defendants served the §ubpoena in the case, and taxed the usual fees for
said service. Verdict for defendants.

. Defendants' attorney claimed the docket fee of $20,-given to

him by Act of Congress. To these items plaintiffs excepted.
1. That the subpcena having been served by the~party, and not
by the marshal, the fees for service and mileage are not recoverable.
2. That the defendants' attorney was not eititled to the do.cket
fee of $20; allowed to the attorney of the successful party in the
courts of the United States.

T. F. M.arshall,for plaintiffs.
Benjamin Gvrant, for the defendants, referred to -2d clause,
1st sec. Act 26th February 1853, Brightly's Dig. 272; 2 Bouv.
Law Dic. tit. Trial; Wh. Law. Die. tit. Trial, p. 1014; Coke
Litt. 124; United States v. Curtis' - olston, 4 Mason 232;
U. S. Dig. 456, 457, par. 13.
MCCANDL-ESS, D. J.-The questions presented are material to
both the debtor and creditor, as well as to gentlemen of the legal
profession. They have been raised to settle a matter of ptac'tice,
about which there has been much diversity of opinion.
t We are indebted for this case to Benjamin Grant, Esq., counsel of defendants.EDs Am. LAw REG.
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This is a case of involuntary bankruptcy. The debtors filed
their answer, lenying the acts of bankruptcy alleged in creditors'
petition, and demanded a trial by jury which was allowed. There
was a trial, and the jury rendered a verdict that the facts set
forth in the petition were not true. It then became the duty of
the court, under the 41st section of the act, to dismiss the proceedings, and the respondents were entitled'to recover costs.
They filed their bill to which the creditors except.
1. That the subpeena having been served by the party, and
not by the marshal, the fees for service and mileage are not
recoverable.
.It is true that the marshal is the executive officer of the court,
and may be directed by the court to serve it; but the mandate
of the writ is not to him, but to the witness who is commanded to
appear and testify. As there is no legislation of Congress directing the service of a subpoena by the marshal, we do not feel disposed to depart from the practice of the state courts, which has
always permitted the party to serve the precept, and allowed him
costs for the same. The 1st section of the Act of 24th of September 1799 requires the marshal "1to execute throughout the
district all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the
authority of the United States." But the subpoena is not directed
to him but to the witness, and the marshal might legitimately
refuse to servo it, unless commanded so to do by an order of the
court. The party is interested in the production of the witness,.
and we can see no good reason why, if he serves the writ, he
should not be paid for it.
It is further objected that the distance charged for mileage was
not actually travelled, but as there are no proofs to sustain this
allegation, it is dismissed. The first excepion is overruled.
2. The second exception raises the question whether the docket
fee of $20, allowed to the attorney of the success'ful party in the
courts of the United States, is properly taxable in bankruptcy,
and, so far as this court is advised, it is a question of the first
impression.
It is clear that in cases of voluntary bankruptcy it is not
allowable; but we are of opinion that in those of involuntary
bankruptcy, where there is a trial by jury, that it is taxable, as
also in those voluntary cases, where, under the. 31st section of
the act, the court is authorized to direct a trial upon specifica.

UNITED STATES v. SIX FERMENTING TUBS.

tions of objections to the bankrupt's discharge. By the Act of
the 26th of February 1853, it is provided that "in lieu of the
compensation now allowed by law to attorneys, solicitors, and
proctors in the United States Cout," the following and no other
compensation shall be taxed and allowed: In a trial before a
jury in civil and criminal causes, or before a referee, or on a
final hearing in equity or admiralty, a docket fee of $20. In
cases at law, where a judgment is entered without a jury, $80,
and $5 where a cause is discontinued. These are all in cases of
adversary proceedings, and the distinction is drawn between a
"1trial" and a judgment without a trial. The word "trial" here,
as illustrated by Mr. Justice STORY, in 4 Mason 235, means a
trial by jury. The pleadings may be filed, the issue made up,
but until the jury is sworn there is no trial. ' In the case before
us there was an issue, the jury were sworn, there was a trial, and
a verdict against the creditors. Besides, General Orders in
Bankruptoy 81, "Icosts in contested adjudicationg," provides that
"in cases of involuntary bankruptcy, where the debtor resists an
adjudication, and the court, after hearing, shall adjudge the
debtbr a bankrupt, the" petitioning creditor shall recover, to
be paid out of the, fund, the same costs that are allowed by law to
,a. party recovering in a suit in equity ; aiid in case the petition
is dismissed (as in this case), the debtor may recover like costs
from the petitioner."
The second exception is, therefore, also overruled, and: the
clerk is -directed to tax a docket fee of $20 to the attorney for
the respondents.

United States- District Couit, District of 'Wisconsin.
THE UNITED STATES v. SIX FERMENTING TUBS-HODSON,
CLAI MANT.'
A claimant may take advantage of the limitation of section 68 of the Internal
Revenue Act of 1864, under an answer of general denial.
The Act of 1866, repealing the 68th section of the Internal RevenueAct; coltinues the section as to offences against the Revenue Laws committed before tha

repeal.
' We are indebted for this case to the courtesyof Judge Miller.-EDs. Am.
LAw.REG.
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THIS was an information against -the apparatus of claiihant
used in the distillation of spirits. Among other breaches of the
Internal Revenue Law it was charged that, between the 3d day
of September 1864 and the 1st day of March 1866, claimant
sold and removed from his distillery for consumption and use,
50,000 gallons of spirits by him manufactured and distilled,
without first paying the duties required by law, and without having the spirits gauged and inspected, or the casks branded. To
the information, claimant answered, "that the said several arti.cles and property seized did not, nor did any part thereof become
forfeited in the manner and form in the said information in that
behalf alleged. .
After all evidence in support of, and in answer to, the alleged
forfeiture had been put in, claimant's counsel offered proof, that
the facts substantially as here proven in support of the ififormation had come to the knowledge of the collector and deputy collector of the district in the month of September 1866, and a
seizure of the same property in the distillery had been then made,
and not prosecuted. The proof was offered for the purpose of
taking advantage of the limitation prescribed in section 68 of the
Act of June 2d 1864 (18 Statutes at Large 248), authorizingseizures, provided "That such seizures be made within thirty
days after the cause for the same shall have come to the knowledge of the collector, or deputy collector, and that proceedings
to enforce said forfeiture shall have been commenced- by such*
collector within twenty 'days after the seizure thereof."
Tile
evidence was objected to on the part of-the prosecution as not
responsive to the information and not evidence under the answer.
The objection was overruled and evidence admitted.
The evidence showed an investigation of the affairs of Hodson,
the claimant, by the collector of his district, and a seizure of the
distillery in September 1866 ; a subsequent abandonment of that
seizure ; a further investigation by the collector, and a second
seizure made in September 1867, upon which the present information was filed within the twenty days allowed by law.
The jury found for the United States, whereupon the claimant
moved to set aside the verdict against him, upon the ground that
it is against the law and the evidence.
MILLER,

J.-The inquiry is in regard to the knowledge of the
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collector and deputy collector of the cause for seizure more than
thirty days before this seizure was made.
Knowledge of the cause for seizure- means knowledge on the
part of the officer of facts tending to establish a cause for seizure
prescribed in the statute. Mere vague rumor or suspicion, or
loose assertions of irresponsible persons are not sufficient. I.
mudt consist of or be founded upon such facts communicated to
or ascertained by the officer from reliable sources, as primdfacie
to establish a fraud upon the law.
The facts relied on in support of this information, and substantially upon which the verdict was rendered, were known to the
collector and deputy collector and to inspector Burpee, who is the
informer, in the fall of the year 1866, a year before this seizure
was made.
The evidence upon the subject of the statute limitation was
submitted to -the jury, together with all the evidence in the cause,
with instructions upon the law of the case.
The jury were
charged that claimant can take advantage of the Statute of
Limitation.; and that the law requires prompt action on the parlt
of revenue officers.
After much reflection I should not feel justified in disturbing
the verdict upon the merits. Finding the verdict upon the evidence, mostly circumstantial, was no abuse .of the prerogative
of the jury. The evidence was sufficient to bring the mind to
the concluiion, that the alleged cause of forfeiture was Well
founded. The impeached witnesses were sufficiently sustained
and corroborated to ahthorize the jury in finding the verdict in
part on their testimony. The means taken by claimant to procure counter affid.ayits from those witnesses no doubt prejudiced
his case *ith the jury.
I will confine this- investigation to the subject of limitation
allowed to be raised at the trial upon the pleadings. The answer
is in the nature of a plea of the general issue. It is a general
denial of the fabts alleged in the information. In cases of seizure this mode of pleading is allowable: ConkIing's Treatise -590.
Special pleadings in actions for penalties and forfeitures, or hi
criminal prosecutions, are almost entirely disused. -A demurrer
to an indictment is occasionally interposed. The general practice
is either a motion to quash, or a motion in arrest, after a verdict
of guilty. In criminal prosecutions, although a defendant may
VOL. XVI.-48

UNITED STATES v. SIX FERMENTING TUBS.

plead to the jurisdiction of the court, there are but few instances
in which be is obliged to have recourse to such a plea. He may
take advantage of the matter under the.general issue: Archbold
Crim. Pl. 80.
In a case under the statute of 81 Elizabeth, which provides
that all actions for any forfeiture upon any penal statute, shall be
brought within two years, the court held that the defendant may
take advantage of th.e statute on the general issue, and need not
plead it : Buller's Nisi Prius 195. In Johnson v. United State.,
8 McLean 89, the court did not permit *the party indicted to take
advantage upon habeas corpus, of the limitation of indictments,
where the objection had not been made of record by plea. In
United States v. Ballard, 3 Id. 469, the question of limitation was
raised upon the date mentioned in the indictment, upon which the
alleged perjury had been committed, and the act was held to bar
the prosecution. In United States v. Mayo, 1 Gall. Rep. 896,
there was a plea of the Statute of Limitation. But in Parsons
v. Hunter, 2 Sumner 419-425, the same court declares in the
opinion; that in suits on penal statutes, the Statute of Limitation
need not be pleaded ; but may be taken advantage of under the
general issue.
By the 32d section of the Crimes Act of Congress (Statutes
at Large 119) it is enacted, " That no person shall be prosecuted., tried or'punished for treason or other capital offence, wilFul murder and forgery excepted, unless the indictment for the
same shall be found by a grand jury within three years next
after the treason or capital offence shall be:committed; nor shall
any person be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offence not
capital unless the indictment for the same shall be found within
two years from the time of committing the offence. Provided,
that nothing therein contained shall extend to any person or persons fleeing from justice." By Acts of Congress, the period of
limitation for the prosecution of any crime arising under the Revenue Law, and suits for fines and forfeitures, is five years.
Cases arising under the act limiting prosecutions have been
presented to the consideration of courts under different forms of
pleading. In United States v. Slocum, 1 Cranch C. C. Rep.
485, the limitation was specially pleaded. In United States v.
Porter, 2 Id. 60, the limitation was not pleaded. In United
States v. Wilson, 8 Id. 441, the question was raised by demur
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rer. In United States v. White, 5 Id. 73, it is decided that
limitation may be given in evidence by the defendant under the
general issue in a criminal cause, and the United States may
give in evidence the fact that defendant fled from justice, and
therefore was not entitled to the benefit of the limitation. In the
opinion, on page 82, the court remarks: "The court is bound to
take notice that the defendant, upon the plea of not guilty, had
a right to avail himself of the limitation of time, if he was entitled to it ; and that the United States had a right to show that
he was not entitled to its benefits."
"If, from accident or
ignorance of his rights, the defendant should have been prevented from asserting or using his right, it might be ground of
a m6tion for a new trial." In the'ease of Lee v. Clark, 2 East
383, 336, an action of debt for a penalty given by the game,
laws, ;pon the plea of nil debet, the verdict was for the plaintiff.
Lord ELLE'ooBOOUGH, during the argument, said -"That not.
withstanding the allegation that the offence was committed within
six calendar months, yet if it were not computed within the time
uirescribed by-the statute, the plaintiff must have been
nonsuited."
LAWRENCE, J., remarked: "The time having elapsed would have
been evidence for the defendant on the plea, of nil debet." See
also 1 Chitty's Grim. Law 471, 475, 626; Espinasse on Penal
Statutes 78.
The statute limitation seems to require that evidence of the
time the officer obtained knowledge of the cause of forfeiture
should be receiveff under the general issue. It is an appropriate
inquiry upon the trial of the cause. Proof on the subject might
involve a more extended range than if the seizure were prohibited
after or between certain dates. -Seizure is an open and notorious
act on the part of the officer, known to the party in possession;
but on what day or time the cause of seizure came to the know.ledge of the officer mnay have to be ascertained from proof of
several facts.
From this examination of the subject, I am satisfied that the
evidence was properly admitted, and that the verdict, under the
instructions of the court -upon this subject, should have -been for
claimant.
A question arises, What effect the repeal .of section 68 has on
this case, if any ? The information charges the offences against
the act to have been committed between the 3d day of September
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1864 and the 1st day of March 1866. 'And the seizure is alleged
to have been made on the 11th day of October 1867, under and
in pursuance of the Act of June 80th 1864 and the acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto.
It is an established rule, that where an action for the recovery
of a penalty, or a proceeding to enforce a forfeiture prescribed
in a legislative act, is pending at the time of the repeal of the
act, or instituted after the repeal, such repeal is a bar to the
action or proceeding, in the absence of a saving clause. in the
repealing act.
A clause of the repealing act provides that the repeal shall
take effect on the 1st day of September 1866. The Act of March
3d 1865 (18 Statutes at Large '472) continues in force section
68 of the Act of.4864. These two last acts were in force at the
time of claimant's operations in the distillery, and for six Ionths
thereafter. The Act of July 1866, repealing section 68, provides, in section 70, " That all the provisions of former acts
repealed shall .be in force for collecting all taxes, duties and
licenses properly assessed, or liable to be assessed, or accruing
under the provisions of acts, the right to which has already
accrued, or which may hereafter accrue under said acts, and for
maintaining and continuing liens, fines, penalties, and forfeitures
incurred under and by virtue thereof, and for carrying out and
completing all-proceedings which have been already commenced,
or that may be commenced to enforce such fines, penalties, and
forfeitures under aid acts." It is therefore apparent *that see
tion 68 of the Act of 1864 remains in force.as to this case, including the proviso of limitation, notwithstanding the repeal.
The. distillery apparatus was subject to seizure as forfeited for
offences propounded in the information before the repeal affected
the section in any manner; and the above provision of the repealing act reserves to the government the right to institute and
prosecute these proceedings to enforce the forfeiture.
The court being' satisfied that the seizure upon which this
information is founded was not made within thirty days after the
cause for the same had come to the knowledge of the collectorand deputy collector, it is therefore ordered that the verdict be
set aside and the information dismissed.

UNITED STATES v. B. & 0. RAILROAD CO.

United States Circuit Court, District of West Virginia,
August 1868.
IE UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO.1
By the Act of Congress of 1864, receipts for goods delivered to a common carrier
for transportation, being in effect inland bills of lading, were not subject to stamp
duty.

A corporation is liable to indictment for the act of its officer or employee, in
issuing papers which the law requires to be stamped, without the proper stamps,
with intent to evade the provisions of the Act of Congress.

THESE were indictments numbered from I to 54, inclusive, for
breaches of the Revenue Laws of the United States.
Fifty of these indictments were for issuing receipts for goods
delivered to the defendant at their depot in Parkersburg, to be
transported by them as a common carrier, to different points upontheir road ; and the remaining four for issuing receipts for moneys
paid for toll. and transportation upon the road, without having
United States revenue stamps affixed and cancelled.
To all of the indictments the defendant demurred.

George ff. Lee, in support of the demurrer.-l. As to the
receipts for freights in question, at the times they -were issued, in
1865 and 1866, upon the true construction of the Revenue Laws
of the United States then in force, such receipts being in legM
effect inland bills of lading, were not subject to stamp duty.
2. As to both classes of- receipts, to constitute the offence under
the Act of Congress of unlawfully issuing papers required to be
stamped without having the proper stamps affixed, the. party issuing must have done- so with the unlawful intent to evade the provisions of the act and to defraud. the revenue, and such intent
on the part of the pilatform-clerk or agent issuing the receipts for
the company, if it existed, could ulot be imputed to a corporation
having no sentient or visible tangible being, and existing only in
contemplation of law; but the, clerk, or agent himself only, and
not the corporation as such, could be held. criminally responsible
for the unlawful act.
Smith, District Attorney, contri-By direction of the court
the argument was confined, at this stage of the case, to the first
point.
I We are indebted for this case to G. H. Lee, Ifsa.. counsel of defendant.-
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